Bolivia 2005: Situation and perspectives of the political juncture in face of President Carlos Mesa’s resignation

Context

President Carlos Mesa’s resignation on Sunday March 6, 2005, as all interviewees coincide, marks a new political panorama and the emergence of a new political and social matrix in Bolivia. Three factors characterize the strong political polarization context in which the President’s resignation was given: the juncture is marked by an intense internationalization, a very confused political panorama characterized by profound mistrust among the diverse social actors and political leaders, and the radical nature of the conflicts, associated with new and more violent forms of expression, which present, in the opinion of the public and of the actors in the political system, the need for a debate on the importance of the social order and the manner in which the principle of authority and rule of law could be recovered.

This new scenario is built on the basis of an agreement signed on March 8 by President Carlos Mesa with the bench heads of the principal political parties represented in Parliament, with the exception of the MAS.

This juncture is marked by the clear break between President Mesa and his government with Evo Morales, and delineates the features of what could become a new governance scheme, supported on a different relationship with public opinion, political parties, regional and social movements, the international community and the Armed Forces. 

In first place, it is possible to point out that significant changes were made in the President-Public Opinion relationship insofar as the discursive axis has passed: i) from choosing “social peace” to accentuating the need for “governance”; ii) from appealing to “passive” support to calling for an “active“ support, and iii) from seeking an equilibrium between the “radical and minority poles” to identifying Evo Morales and Abel Mamani as the persons responsible for the lack of governance in the country.

In second place, President Mesa modified his relationship with Parliament, by breaking his informal approaches with the MAS and signing an agreement with the bench heads of the traditional parties (MNR, MIR and NFR).

En third place, the marked distancing of President Carlos Mesa with the social movements and the absence of a formal link with regional movements.  For Abel Mamani, the options of President Carlos Mesa divide the people: by associating with the right and the “massacre authors of October”, the President would have betrayed the City of El Alto, enabling racism and creating greater conditions for repression and intimidation of popular leaders. In relation to the regional movements, a formal link is not yet observed in the President’s discourse.

In fourth place, the international community seems to have played a fundamental role in the configuration of this new political and social matrix.  In face of the radicalization of Evo Morales and the alliance MAS-MNR-NFR to approve a hydrocarbons law considered unacceptable for transnational companies and the international financial community, agreements would have been negotiated with strong sympathies among presidents in the region to support a Carlos Mesa and isolate Evo Morales.

Finally, the Armed Forces were extremely prudent during the political crisis in face of the President’s resignation, declaring publicly their allegiance to democratic institutionalism.

The political situation in Bolivia presents a series of immediate challenges that will put to test the consistency of the discourse and the action of the government, as well as institutional stability.  In first place, the lifting of the blockade in the road connecting Santa Cruz and Cochabamba in the Chapare region. This was a blockade that responded to mobilization of MAS coca-farmer grassroots groups who blockaded one of the most important roads for export of soybean exports from Santa Cruz. In second place, the approval of the hydrocarbons law, a process in direct relation to the Chapare blockade.

The consistency and orientation of the government del President Carlos Mesa as well as the strategic orientations of the MAS and its capacity for linking with the different social movements will be assessed in the short term starting from two elements.  On one hand, the capacity for recovering principle of authority, and how to do it, that is: How much dialogue and how much force will be used to make application of Law and justice in face of certain forms of social protest?  On the other, capacity for promoting the political agenda in Parliament and the different orientations of the different laws that constitute the central axis of the political agenda (Hydrocarbons law, law of convocation to an Autonomy Referendum, and the Constituent Assembly, election of Prefects).  Is a scenario possible where the MAS proposal prevails? What consequences will this have for democratic governance?